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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we present a study on the recent 
approaches in handling Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attacks. DDoS attack is a fairly 
new type of attack to cripple the availability of 
Internet services and resources. A DDos attack 
can originate from anywhere in the network and 
typically overwhelms the victim server by 
sending a huge number of packets.  Several 
remedial measures have been proposed by 
various researchers.  This paper attempts to 
discuss the recent offerings to handle the DDoS 
attacks. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Internet security has been a concern for all the 
users.  However, a very strange kind of incident 
took place in 1999 [24]. Another attack took 
place against Yahoo! in February 2000 [25]. 
Again on 20
th
October 2002, another DDoS 
attack took place, where 13 root servers 
responsible for providing Domain Name System 
service were affected.  It caused seven of the 
thirteen root servers crippled [23]. 
 A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attack is an attack to prevent the users from using 
the resources of a victim’s computer.  It is a large 
scale attack in a co-ordinated fashion, which is 
typically launched indirectly with the help of 
other computers in the Internet.  There are 
several kinds of DDoS attacks.  There are two 
main classes of such attacks: (1) bandwidth 
depletion and (2) resource depletion attacks.  In 
case of bandwidth depletion attack, the victim 
network is flooded with unwanted traffic that 
prevents legitimate traffic from reaching the 
victim computer.  In the other case of resource 
depletion attacks, the attack is targeted to tie up 
the resources of the victim computer [27] [28]. 
 A new kind of DDoS attack is known as 
DDoS Reflector attack.  It is a kind of attack 
which is difficult to defend as the victim 
computer is flooded with traffic from other 
Internet servers, which were not even 
compromised.  This attack exploits the SYN 
ACKs in response to the TCP SYN requests and 
other TCP packets.  Basically, attackers misuse 
this acknowledging packet as a reflector. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  
in Section 2 we discuss further about the DDoS 
Reflector attack. In the following four sections, 
the preventive measures are discussed. In Section 
3, the Rate Limit solution to handle DDoS attack 
is discussed; Defense by Offense is explained in 
Section 4; Active Filtering solution approach is 
discussed in Section 5; Section 6 talks about the 
IP Trace back approach; and the concluding 
  
     
remarks are in Section 7.  There is also a 
Reference section at the end.    
 
2. DDoS Reflector ATTACK 
There are various kinds of DDoS attacks, though 
we will discuss a typical reflector attack in this 
section [29].  Any server that supports a protocol 
which replies with a packet after it has received a 
request packet can be misused as a reflector 
without the need for a server compromise [27]. 
 In Figure 1, a reflector attack is shown.  
Here, the agents send their packets with the false 
source address, also known as spoofed address, 
to the victim’s address, to innocent servers,   
 
Figure 1. A DDoS Reflector Attack Scenario 
 
which act as reflectors.  The interesting thing is, 
the source addresses of the attack packets 
received by the victim are not spoofed, rather 
they are of the uncompromised servers.  The set 
up of these attacks organize the “masters” and 
“agents” in such a way that, the rate of the 
packets and the size of the packets get amplified. 
As a result, it becomes very difficult to trace 
back an attack to the initiator of such an attack. 
 
3. RATE LIMIT 
There are several approaches proposed by 
researchers to defeat DDoS attacks with the help 
of rate limit framework [12-15].  However, in 
this paper, we will discuss two such approaches. 
 We begin our discussion with the approach 
offered in the paper by Jing, et. al. [12].  It 
proposes the usage of three processes: a) attack 
detection, b) deciding the rate limit, and c) 
applying the rate limit to the attack traffic closer 
to the sources. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Architecture of O2 -DN 
 
 Figure 2 shows the three major processes of 
the O2 –DN architecture.  These are: (1) Attack 
Detection Agent (ADA), (2) Defense Service Provider 
(DSP), and (3) Rate Limiter (RL).  
 ADA is installed as a software or hardware 
in the victim or the firewall.  It is responsible for 
sending an alert and a defense request to the 
DSP, as soon as an attack is detected.  The DSP 
is responsible for processing the defense service 
orders and provide defense services.  When it 
receives a defense request, it verifies its 
authenticity to make sure that, it is not a new 
DoS attack.  It then performs rate limit decision-
making and sends rate limit commands to RL.  
The RL is responsible for limiting the rate of one 
specific flow.  It also reports the approximate 
real-time rate information to the local DSP.  RL 
is deployed by the Internet Service Provider and 
managed by the local DSP server in the same 
domain [12]. 
 In another approach, Mahajan et. al. 
proposes a mechanism for detecting and 
controlling high bandwidth aggregates, which is 
typically resulted when a DDoS attack takes 
place [15].    
 An aggregate is a collection of packets from 
one or more flows with some similar properties.  
These properties could be: destination or source 
address prefix, certain application type like 
streaming video, TCP SYN packets, ICMP 
ECHO packets, etc.  It can be very broad (e.g., 
TCP traffic) or very narrow (HTTP traffic) to a 
specific host. 
  
     
 
Figure 3. Pushback Approach 
 
 
 It proposes a pushback mechanism as shown 
in Figure 3.  Pushback is a cooperative 
mechanism to control an aggregate upstream of 
network traffic.  Here, the congested router sends 
commands to its adjacent upstream routers to 
rate-limit the aggregate.  These are sent only to 
the contributing neighbors as those are 
responsible for sending major fraction of the 
aggregate traffic.  Apart from saving upstream 
bandwidth through early dropping of packets that 
would have been dropped downstream at the 
congested router, this pushback method helps to 
focus rate-limiting on the attack traffic within the 
aggregate [15].   
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Architecture of an ACC-enabled Router 
 
The proposed aggregate-based congestion 
control (ACC) architecture, which operates at the 
granularity of the aggregates is shown in 
Figure4.  The packets of high-bandwidth 
aggregates pass through the rate-limiter.  All 
packets dropped by RED are passed to the ACC 
Agent for identifying aggregates. 
 
4. DEFENSE BY OFFENSE 
There is an interesting proposal published by 
Walfish et. al. in which the remedial measure of 
DDoS attacks at application level is offered by 
sending higher volume of traffic[26]. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. An Attacked Server Without Speak-up 
 
The logic behind this scheme is not to just slow 
down the bad clients, but encouraging the good 
clients to send higher volume of traffic.  It 
assumes that, if the bad clients are already using 
most of their upload bandwidth, by encouraging 
the clients to send higher volume of traffic will 
change in the volume of good clients only. 
 In Figure 5, diagram of an attacked server is 
shown without speak-up strategy.  Here the bad 
clients have occupied a higher portion of the 
bandwidth.  With a speak-up scheme in place, 
the bandwidth is now occupied more by the good 
clients as is shown in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6. An Attacked Server With Speak-up 
 
The speak-up needs a mechanism to measure the 
bandwidth.  Its primary responsibility is to 
encourage the clients causing the clients to send 
more traffic. To implement these mechanisms, a 
front-end called thinner is used by the speak-ups. 
The thinner implements the encouragement and 
controls by sending requests to the server.   
 
5. ACTIVE FILTERING 
There are significant work done to protect 
victims from DDoS attacks by active filtering 
method [16-22].  
  
     
 
Figure 7. Architecture of the Gateway-based Defense 
System 
We begin our discussion in this section with a 
Gateway Architecture by Xuan et. al. [16].  It 
proposes a defense system to detect attacks and 
control the traffic.  It protects TCP friendly 
traffic occupying the main body of the Internet 
traffic.  The gateways are deployed at various 
locations in the network to detect the attacks and 
perform the traffic access control as well.  This 
architecture is shown in Figure 7. 
 In another work, Yaar et. al. offered a new 
idea, where they proposed a packet marking 
scheme based on Pi, and also a new filtering 
mechanisms [20].  The Pi DDoS defense scheme 
comprises of a packet marking algorithm, which 
encodes a complete Pi in each packet.  It also 
comprises of a packet filtering algorithm, which 
determines how a DDoS victim uses this scheme 
effectively. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 8. The Basic Stack Marking Scheme 
 
The basic stack marking scheme is shown in 
Figure 8.  It shows how the Pi mark evolves as 
the packet traverses R1 through R9. 
 
Figure 9 shows an example of stack-based 
scheme with write ahead. This scheme allows the 
inclusion of markings from router R3.  Stack 
marking eliminates the interaction between Pi-
enabled routers and legacy routers that is present 
in TTL marking. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. The  Stack Marking Scheme with Write-
ahead 
 
It is assumed that each router knows IP address 
of the last-hop routers or hosts from which it 
receives packets.  If it is also assumed that each 
router knows the IP address of the next-hop 
routers or hosts to which it is forwarding 
packets, then the router is capable of  marking 
the packets on their behalf.  All the router needs 
to substitute its own IP address for the last-hop 
IP address and the next-hop IP address for its IP 
address when calculating the bits to mark.  This 
later marking is called write-ahead marking. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. History-based IP Filtering Technique 
 
There is another approach based on IP source 
address filtering proposed by Peng et. al. [22].  
This approach utilizes history-based IP filtering 
for the edge router.  Edge router is the router 
which provides access to the Internet to the 
domain of a sub-network, which this scheme is 
meant to defend.  It uses a pre-built IP address 
database based on the history of all the legitimate 
  
     
IP addresses, and accordingly admits the 
incoming packets. 
 Figure 10 shows the Bloom filter used for 
computing the k distinct IP address digests for 
each IP address using independent uniform hash 
functions.  It uses the N-bit results to index into a 
2
N–sized bit array.  The array is initialized to 
zeros and bits are set to one as packets are 
received.  The validity is checked by computing 
the k digests on the IP address of an incoming IP 
packet and also checking the indicated bit 
positions.  This test indicates that, if any one of 
them is zero, the IP address was not stored in the 
table.  
 
6. IP TRACEBACK 
Like the previous methods discussed in the 
earlier sections, there are also significant work 
done to protect victims from DDoS attacks by IP 
traceback method [1-11].   We will focus 
primarily on one such recent work. 
 Strayer et. al. proposes an architecture for 
multi-stage traceback to handle DDoS attacks[1].   
This architecture is called Stealthy Tracing 
Attackers Research Light TracE (STARLITE), 
which is an extended version of Source Path 
Isolation Engine (SPIE) [30]. This STARLITE 
architecture constructs a prototype to integrate 
single packet traceback with stepping stone 
detection. 
  
 
 
Figure 11.  Trace across a Stepping Stone 
 
In order to trace an attack path through 
laundering hosts, which are also called the 
stepping stones in this context, the chain of 
connections is discovered.  In Figure 11, the 
chain of connections between an attacker and the 
victim is shown, which is called an extended 
connection. 
 
Figure 12.  The SPIE Architecture 
 
In Figure 12, the basic architecture of the SPIE 
system is shown.  SPIE is a log-based traceback 
system.  The basics of its tracebacking 
capabilities of the IP packets depend on auditing 
the network routers.  The SPIE Traceback 
Manager (STM) is responsible for controlling the 
entire system. 
 The STARLITE system integrates the 
stepping stone detection concept into the SPIE 
system to utilize the rich communication 
infrastructure of SPIE. 
 
 
Figure 13.  Multi-stage Trace – Step 1 
 
 
The multi-stage trace proposed in STARLITE is 
shown in Figure 13.  Here, P stands for a packet, 
V for a victim, and T for the time of attack.   
DGA is the Data Generation Agents in this 
diagram.  SSA stands for the Stepping Stones 
Aggregator. 
 
  
     
 
 
Figure 14.  Multi-stage Trace – Step 2 
 
 
The querying for stepping stones is shown in 
Figure 14.  It shows how the Traceback 
Controller (TBC) receives the attack graph, 
identifies the router, and finally extracts the 
connection description from the traced packet. 
 Figure 15 shows the next step in the multi-
stage traceback process.  The Traceback 
Controller returns to the SPIE Traceback 
Manager to ask SPIE for constructing a new 
query based on the packet from the incoming 
connection and then continue the trace. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.  Multi-stage Trace – Step 3 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Distributed Denial of Services attack poses great 
challenges to the researchers in the field of 
network security.  It has already taken a heavy 
toll on many Internet based service providers in 
the world.  There have been significant amount 
of work to tackle such DDoS attack with 
different kinds of approaches.  In this paper, we 
have presented four major approaches that are 
being considered by the experts in this field.  
Perhaps it will be a hard and impossible task to 
discuss each and every published work in this 
field and propose the best solution.  That’s why 
we have kept the scope of the paper limited to 
just categorizing the existing solutions.   
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